Networks, Standards and Intellectual Property Rights

This paper reviews issues that lie at the intersection between intellectual property rights (IPR) and network effects, especially in the context of the global economy. Some of the relevant questions are: (1) How do IPR influence the provision of goods exhibiting network effects? (2) How do network effects in turn influence the creation of intellectual property? And (3) how do aspects of the global economy interact with both IPR and network effects? We synthesize what is known from the existing literature to answer these questions.Intellectual Property Rights, Network Effects, Globalization, Standards, Social Networks, Software Piracy

Institutional Change and Product Composition: Does the Initial Quality of Institutions Matter?

We argue that the quality of institutions that enforce contracts and protect property rights influences the costs of producing high-value added (complex) versus low-value added (simple) products. Since data is hardly available for domestic transactions, we generate predictions about the relationship between the quality of institutions and product composition with an international trade model and use a rich international trade data set for empirical tests. We find that improvements in institutional quality increase the share and volume of a country's complex product exports. However, the initial quality of institutions is important, since in countries with the least developed institutions, the share of complex products in exports is generally small and, institutional reform has almost no influence on simple product exports. These findings cast doubts on the efficacy of institutional reform in countries with underdeveloped institutions.Complex and simple products, volume effect of institutions, compositional effect of institutions

Directed Technical Change and International Trade

Recent changes in comparative advantage in the largest OECD economies differ significantly from the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory. Japan's rising share of OECD machinery exports and the improvement in the comparative advantage of the USA and Germany in heavy industry were accompanied by growing scarcities of the factors used intensively in the favored sector of each country. Here we examine Acemoglu's (1998, 2002) hypothesis that technical change may be directed toward raising the marginal productivity of abundant factors. Testing this hypothesis with 1970-1992 export data from 14 OECD countries, we find evidence that international comparative advantage was reshaped by innovation biased toward the abundant factors in the largest economies

Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows

Globalization and increasing international flows of goods and capital have created a sense that the importance of individual nation states and the public goods they provide, including law and law enforcement institutions, is in decline. Opting out of domestic legal institutions and into those of a third country or into an international architecture have been elevated to important complements, if not substitutes for good institutions at home. If traders and investors could indeed effectively opt-out of their home jurisdiction\u27s legal systems, we should observe empirically that the quality of domestic institutions has little impact on international patterns of trade flows. Yet, empirical studies suggest the opposite, namely that a country\u27s domestic legal institutions have strong explanatory power for its integration in international markets

Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows

Why do domestic legal institutions matter, and why can trading parties-in particular exporters of complex goods-not easily opt-out of their domestic legal institutions? The authors argue that domestic institutions remain important even in a globalized world, because they are the final option for enforcing a claim against a party in the event of a breach of contract. International contracts take place in the shadow of the parties\u27 home institutions. Unless parties can negotiate a settlement, or the losing party voluntarily complies with a foreign court or arbitration ruling, the winning party must seek enforcement against the assets of the losing party- and they tend to be located primarily in that party\u27s home jurisdiction. For reasons further explained below, importers and exporters are not equally exposed to the risk of bad domestic institutions\u27 actions. By implication, exports, and particularly complex goods exports suffer more from bad legal institutions in the exporter\u27s home jurisdiction, than imports

Trade, Law and Product Complexity

How does the quality of national institutions that enforce the rule of law influence international trade? Anderson and Marcouiller argue that bad institutions located in the importer’s country deter international trade because they enable economic predators to steal and extort rents at the importer’s border. We complement this research and show how good institutions located in the exporter’s country enhance international trade, in particular, trade in complex products whose characteristics are difficult to fully specify in a contract. We argue that both exporter and importer institutions affect international as well as domestic transaction costs in complex and simple product markets. International transaction costs are a part of the costs of trade. Domestic transaction costs affect complex and simple products differently, thereby changing a country’s comparative advantage in producing such goods. We find ample empirical evidence for these predictions: countries that have good institutions tend to export more complex products and import more simple products. Furthermore, institutions have a stronger influence on trade via production costs (comparative advantage) than through international transactions costs. International institutions seem to operate as substitutes for domestic institutions, because good domestic institutions are less important for promoting exports in those countries that have signed the New York Convention

Networks, Standards and Intellectual Property Rights

This paper reviews issues that lie at the intersection between intellectual property rights (IPR) and network effects, especially in the context of the global economy. Some of the relevant questions are: (1) How do IPR influence the provision of goods exhibiting network effects? (2) How do network effects in turn influence the creation of intellectual property? And (3) how do aspects of the global economy interact with both IPR and network effects? We synthesize what is known from the existing literature to answer these questions

Institutional Change and Product Composition: Does the Initial Quality of Institutions Matter?

We argue that the quality of institutions that enforce contracts and protect property rights influences the costs of producing high-value added (complex) versus low-value added (simple) products. Since data is hardly available for domestic transactions, we generate predictions about the relationship between the quality of institutions and product composition with an international trade model and use a rich international trade data set for empirical tests. We find that improvements in institutional quality increase the share and volume of a country's complex product exports. However, the initial quality of institutions is important, since in countries with the least developed institutions, the share of complex products in exports is generally small and, institutional reform has almost no influence on simple product exports. These findings cast doubts on the efficacy of institutional reform in countries with underdeveloped institutions.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40048/2/wp662.pd